

The Long-Term Decline Of The "Ummah" Vote: A Seven-Decade Electoral Trajectory Of Islamic Parties In Indonesia (1955–2024)

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Abstract:

This study examines the longitudinal electoral performance of Islamic political parties in Indonesia over seven decades, from the landmark 1955 election to the 2024 polls. Despite Indonesia's significant societal shift toward increased public piety, Islamic parties—including Masyumi, NU, PPP, PKS, PAN, and PKB—have faced a paradoxical stagnation and long-term decline in their aggregate vote share. Using a mixed-methods approach that integrates historical institutionalism with quantitative trend analysis, this research identifies the structural and agency-driven factors behind this "Ummah vote" depletion. The findings reveal that the robust "aliran" (stream) politics of 1955, which once commanded 44% of the vote, has been eroded by persistent fragmentation, the "nationalist appropriation" of religious symbols, and a shift toward clientelistic pragmatism. We argue that Islamic parties face a "survival vs. identity" dilemma: while moderate metamorphosis allows them to remain in governing coalitions, it dilutes their ideological distinctiveness, leading to electoral decay. This study verifies the "Inclusion-Moderation" thesis in the Indonesian context, suggesting that as these parties become embedded in the secular-pragmatic democratic framework, they lose their monopoly over the Muslim electorate. This research contributes to the global discourse on political Islam by demonstrating that social religiosity does not automatically translate into religious party hegemony in a competitive democratic marketplace.

Keywords: Political Islam; Electoral Trajectory; Ummah Vote; Inclusion-Moderatio; Party Fragmentation.

Abstract:

Studi ini meneliti kinerja elektoral longitudinal partai-partai politik Islam di Indonesia selama tujuh dekade, dari pemilu penting tahun 1955 hingga pemilu 2024. Meskipun terjadi pergeseran signifikan dalam masyarakat Indonesia menuju peningkatan kesalehan publik, partai-partai Islam—termasuk Masyumi, NU, PPP, PKS, PAN, dan PKB—telah menghadapi stagnasi paradoks dan penurunan jangka panjang dalam pangsa suara agregat mereka. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan metode campuran yang mengintegrasikan institusionalisme historis dengan analisis tren kuantitatif, penelitian ini mengidentifikasi faktor-faktor struktural dan yang didorong oleh agensi di balik penipisan "suara Ummah" ini. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa politik "aliran" (arus) yang kuat pada tahun 1955, yang pernah menguasai 44% suara, telah terkikis oleh fragmentasi yang terus-menerus, "pengambilalihan nasionalis" simbol-simbol keagamaan, dan pergeseran menuju pragmatisme klientelistik. Kami berpendapat bahwa partai-partai Islam menghadapi dilema "bertahan hidup vs. identitas": sementara metamorfosis moderat memungkinkan mereka untuk tetap berada dalam koalisi pemerintahan, hal itu

melemahkan kekhasan ideologis mereka, yang menyebabkan penurunan elektoral. Studi ini memverifikasi tesis "Inklusi-Moderasi" dalam konteks Indonesia, menunjukkan bahwa ketika partai-partai ini tertanam dalam kerangka demokrasi sekuler-pragmatis, mereka kehilangan monopoli atas pemilih Muslim. Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada wacana global tentang Islam politik dengan menunjukkan bahwa religiusitas sosial tidak secara otomatis diterjemahkan menjadi hegemoni partai keagamaan di pasar demokrasi yang kompetitif.

Kata kunci: Islam Politik; Lintasan Elektoral; Suara Umat; Inklusi-Moderasi; Fragmentasi Partai.

INTRODUCTION

For over seven decades, the Indonesian political landscape has served as a compelling crucible for debates within comparative politics, particularly concerning the resilience of religious identity in democratic systems. As the world's most populous Muslim-majority nation, early theoretical expectations—largely rooted in the "cleavage theory" posited by Lipset and Rokkan—predicted that religious identity would function as the primary determinant of electoral behavior. The dawn of Indonesian democracy during the 1955 General Election appeared to validate this thesis with striking clarity. Islamic parties, led by the modernist Masyumi and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), captured nearly 44% of the national vote. During this era, Indonesia's political sociology was sharply bifurcated along the *aliran* (stream) lines described by Geertz, where the *santri* (devout Muslims) found a natural and potent political vessel in Islamic parties to channel their aspirations against the *abangan* (nominal Muslims) and secular-nationalist factions.

However, a profound sociopolitical anomaly has emerged as we traverse the trajectory from 1955 to the contemporary 2024 cycle. Despite a documented wave of "green conservatism" and a surge in public religious consciousness since the 1990s, the collective electoral performance of Islamic parties has reached a state of chronic stagnation, if not a proportional decline. This phenomenon constitutes what scholars identify as the "Islamic Electoral Paradox": a society becoming culturally more religious yet politically more secular. Post-Suharto era parties such as PKB, PAN, PKS, PPP, and PBB rarely surpass a combined psychological threshold of 30–35% of the total vote. The fundamental question, therefore, remains: Why has the "Ummah Vote"—once so formidable in 1955—undergone such a sustained depletion in a society that increasingly asserts its Islamic identity?

The existing literature regarding the electoral performance of Islamic parties in Indonesia is generally divided into three major schools of thought. The first is the Sociological-Cultural Stream, pioneered by Clifford Geertz's conceptualization of *aliran*. While Geertz argued that politics was a mirror of deep-seated social structures, contemporary studies by Liddle and Mujani (2007) have challenged the persistence of these primordial ties. They contend that leadership charisma and macroeconomic conditions—indicative of "rational choice" behavior—now outweigh theological obligations. Consequently, the decline of Islamic parties is viewed as evidence of "de-aliranization," wherein Muslim voters no longer perceive a theological transgression in

supporting nationalist entities like Golkar, PDIP, or Gerindra.

The second perspective is the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis. Scholars such as Jillian Schwedler (2006) and Dirk Tomsa (2008) suggest that participation within a democratic framework compels Islamic parties to move toward the "median voter" to ensure institutional survival. A prime example is the PKS, which transitioned from an exclusive *da'wah* movement into an "open party." However, this study proposes a counter-narrative: while moderation may facilitate parliamentary survival, it simultaneously dilutes the ideological differentiation that serves as the primary attraction for the ideological core, ultimately precipitating a decline in long-term support.

The third lens involves Institutionalism and Cartelization. Slater (2004) and Ambardi (2009) argue that the Indonesian party system has devolved into a "party cartel." In this arrangement, ideological distinctions between Islamic and nationalist parties blur as all actors engage in bureaucratic rent-seeking and pragmatic "big-tent" coalitions. By joining the executive power structure, parties like PKB or PPP lose their ability to offer distinct, Islam-based policy alternatives, subsequently alienating their idealist constituents.

Despite the breadth of these studies, a significant research gap persists. Most analyses remain cross-sectional, focusing on isolated post-Reformasi elections. There is a dearth of longitudinal research that connects the data points from the 1955 watershed moment to the 2024 projections. This article fills that void by arguing that the erosion of the "Ummah Vote" is not a temporary tactical failure, but rather a symptom of "Structural Decay" driven by three synchronous factors: persistent internal fragmentation, the failure to convert social capital (from mass organizations or *ormas*) into political capital, and the "narrative theft" of Islamic symbols by nationalist parties.

Understanding why the "big tent" model of Masyumi in 1955 has never been replicated is essential. The fragmentation between PKS, PAN, PKB, and PPP reflects the shattering of religious authority in Indonesia. Without a singular authority capable of mobilizing the faithful, the "Ummah Vote" remains a fragmented political myth. This analysis is particularly crucial as we look toward 2029, where Gen Z and Millennial voters increasingly distance themselves from traditional identity politics.

This research formulates several core problems: How has the electoral trajectory of Islamic parties transformed through the multi-party system of 1955, the forced fusion of the New Order, and the competitive landscape of 1999–2024? What structural and agency-driven factors explain the failure of these parties to capture the Islamization of the public sphere? Finally, is political Islam in Indonesia moving toward "ideological extinction" or a pragmatic metamorphosis?

By deconstructing 70 years of electoral data, this study aims to build a new theoretical model of "Islamic Party Survival" in middle-income democracies. Theoretically, it challenges the linear assumption between societal religiosity and religious party support, suggesting instead that Islamic identity in Indonesia has been "nationalized"—absorbed by the state and secular actors, thus stripping Islamic parties of their monopoly over moral and religious issues. Empirically, it maps the "turning points" of 2004 and 2009 where momentum was lost. Ultimately, this article contends that the survival of Islamic

parties today comes at a high cost: the loss of their ideological essence as a genuine alternative force.

RESEARCH METHOD

To investigate the intricate electoral trajectory of Islamic political entities over seven decades (1955–2025), this study employs an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design. This dual-phase approach is selected for its capacity to synthesize broad quantitative trends with deep qualitative insights. By integrating these paradigms, the research moves beyond the mere mapping of statistical fluctuations ("the what") to uncover the underlying causal mechanisms and institutional logic ("the why") behind the observed phenomena within Indonesia's volatile political landscape.

The primary quantitative dataset is derived from the official legislative election results (DPR) released by the General Elections Commission (KPU) and the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The temporal scope encompasses 13 pivotal electoral cycles: 1955, 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, 2019, and 2024. The unit of analysis focuses on national vote shares and parliamentary seat conversion of nine seminal political entities, categorized by their theological and historical roots: Modernist: Masyumi, Parmusi, PAN, PKS, and PBB. Traditionalist: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Perti, PPP, and PKB.

The quantitative phase is executed in two stages. First, Longitudinal Descriptive Analysis is utilized to visualize the aggregate "Ummah Vote" and identify "critical junctures" of expansion or depletion. Second, the study applies the Pedersen Index of Electoral Volatility to quantify voter instability within the Islamic bloc. By comparing the volatility of the post-Suharto era (1999–2024) with the foundational 1955 period, the research empirically tests whether current trends signify a "de-aliranization" of the electorate or merely internal fragmentation.

To contextualize numerical data, the study adopts Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA). This method is uniquely suited for handling macro-social variables over an extended *longue durée*. Through the systematic vetting of party archives, manifestos, and parliamentary records, the research traces ideological shifts and institutional adaptations. This is further framed by Path Dependency theory, investigating how historical "lock-in" effects—such as the forced party fusion of 1973 or the internal schisms of the early 2000s—created self-reinforcing mechanisms that constrained the future growth of the Islamic political base.

To ensure robust internal validity, the study triangulates electoral data with public opinion surveys from prominent research institutes spanning the last decade. This allows for an assessment of contemporary Muslim voter behavior against historical patterns. Finally, the research employs Trend Projection Analysis to forecast electoral trajectories for 2025 and 2029, incorporating demographic shifts, specifically the rise of Gen Z and the potential saturation of identity-based mobilization. By integrating rigorous data with historical narrative, this methodology provides a solid empirical foundation for the argument of structural decay within Indonesia's religious political sphere.

The Transformation of Electoral Trajectories 1955–2024

The electoral transformation of Islamic political parties in Indonesia over the last seven decades reveals a non-linear trajectory characterized by structural decay. The longitudinal data suggest that Islamic political potency reached its zenith in 1955, suffered systemic repression and forced fusion during the authoritarian New Order, and has failed to achieve a full recovery within the competitive post-1999 democratic landscape.

The 1955 General Election remains the "gold standard" for Islamic political mobilization in Indonesia. Aggregate data confirms that the coalition of Islamic parties—spearheaded by Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)—commanded nearly 44% of the national vote.

Table 1. Electoral Performance of Islamic Parties in the 1955 Election

Political Party	Vote Percentage (%)	Seat Count	Orientation
Masyumi	20.92	57	Modernist
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)	18.41	45	Traditionalist
PSII	2.89	8	Traditionalist
Perti	1.28	4	Traditionalist
Combined Total	43.50	114	

Source: KPU RI and BPS (2025), reprocessed

Interpreting this through the lens of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) **cleavage theory**, the 1955 results demonstrate a near-perfect institutionalization of the *santri-abangan* social divide. Masyumi and NU functioned not merely as political vehicles but as holistic representations of theological identity. The subsequent collapse of this hegemony was not the result of electoral failure but of political "decapitation" by the Sukarno regime (the 1960 banning of Masyumi), which instilled a lasting institutional trauma.

The second transformation occurred in 1973 when the Suharto regime mandated the forced fusion of all Islamic variants into the United Development Party (PPP). This era represented a phase of state-engineered depoliticization. An interview with a senior former PPP official (Informant A, Jakarta, 2024) highlighted the internal friction:

"We were forced into a house whose foundation we did not build. Within PPP, factionalism between NU and Parmusi elements was often sharper than our competition with Golkar. The state neutralized us by ensuring we remained preoccupied with internal strife."

The stagnation of the "Ummah vote" during this period (where PPP consistently hovered between 15–27%) verifies the inclusion-moderation thesis in reverse: forced inclusion under an authoritarian regime did not catalyze healthy moderation but rather precipitated a decay in cadre regeneration and ideological clarity.

The post-1998 liberalization triggered an explosion of Islamic parties. However, fragmentation failed to increase the aggregate vote share; instead, it accelerated a downward trend.

Table 2. Trajectory of Seats and Vote Shares for Major Islamic Parties (1999–2024)

Year	PKB (%)	PAN (%)	PKS (%)	PPP (%)	Total
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					Combined*
1999	12.61	7.12	1.36	10.71	37.5%
2004	10.57	6.44	7.34	8.15	38.3%
2009	4.94	6.01	7.88	5.32	29.1%
2014	9.04	7.59	6.79	6.53	31.4%
2019	9.69	6.84	8.21	4.52	30.1%
2024	10.62	7.24	8.42	3.87	31.2%

*Includes minor parties (PBB, Ummat, etc.)

Source: KPU RI and BPS (2025), reprocessed

Since 2009, the data indicate chronic stagnation around the 30–31% mark. This confirms Koppel's (2002) assertions regarding the vulnerability of religious parties during democratic transitions. Furthermore, this study validates the cartel party theory (Katz & Mair). Parties such as PKB and PAN, despite their sociological roots in NU and Muhammadiyah, have transitioned into pragmatic entities. They increasingly prioritize access to state resources over the advocacy of substantive Islamic agendas, effectively functioning as "junior partners" in broader pragmatic coalitions rather than ideological alternatives.

Explaining the Decline

Based on the longitudinal data spanning 1955–2024 and a deep sociopolitical analysis, the erosion of the "Ummah vote" can be elucidated through the dynamic interaction between structural factors (systemic and environmental constraints) and agency-driven factors (internal party strategies and elite behavior).

Structural factors represent systemic conditions beyond the immediate control of Islamic parties that significantly restrict their maneuvers and electoral viability.

The first is nationalist appropriation and narrative theft. Perhaps the most decisive structural factor is the "self-Islamization" of nationalist parties (e.g., PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra). By establishing religious auxiliary organizations—such as PDIP's *Baitul Muslimin*—and co-opting prominent clerics, nationalist entities have successfully appropriated Islamic narratives. Consequently, Muslim voters increasingly perceive their religious aspirations as being adequately represented by large, "catch-all" parties that possess a higher probability of winning, thereby stripping Islamic parties of their monopoly over religious issues.

The second is institutional engineering and electoral systems. The adoption of the open-list proportional system and the incremental raising of the parliamentary threshold have created a punitive environment for niche ideological parties. These mechanisms force parties toward pragmatic, mass-market mobilization. Islamic parties, often confined to specific ideological silos, struggle to survive in a system that rewards broad-based, resource-heavy campaigning over theological purity.

The third shift is issue salience. Although Indonesian society has undergone a cultural "green wave" of religiosity, the hierarchy of needs at the ballot box remains dominated by material concerns. Voters prioritize economic stability, employment, and infrastructure over moral-religious rhetoric. Islamic parties are frequently perceived as

being more proficient in moral discourse than in offering technocratic solutions to bread-and-butter issues, leading to a disconnect between cultural identity and political choice.

Agency factors refer to the subjective decisions, leadership styles, and strategic orientations adopted by the internal leadership of Islamic parties.

The first is persistent fragmentation and elite egos. The limited "Ummah" electoral niche is further diluted by persistent internal schisms. The emergence of splinter parties—such as *Partai Ummat* (from PAN) or *Gelora* (from PKS)—weakens the collective bargaining power of political Islam. While the 1955 success was predicated on the unifying "big tent" of Masyumi, the contemporary era is characterized by an "electoral civil war" where Islamic elites compete more fiercely with one another than with nationalist rivals.

The second is the dilemma of moderation vs. puritanism. Islamic parties are trapped in a strategic paradox. If they adopt a highly inclusive and moderate stance to capture the median voter (as seen with PKB or PAN), they risk diluting their ideological brand and alienating their core constituents. Conversely, a rigid, puritanical approach (e.g., PBB) effectively caps their growth at a marginal level. The failure to navigate this "Goldilocks zone" of political identity has resulted in chronic stagnation.

The third, leadership crises, and the moral tax. Several parties, most notably PPP, have suffered from leadership instability and a reliance on traditional patronage networks. Critically, Islamic parties face a "moral tax": when their elites are embroiled in corruption scandals, the electoral backlash is significantly more severe than for nationalist parties because their voters hold them to a higher ethical standard rooted in religious principles.

The fourth, conversion failure of social capital: There is a widening gap between religious social capital (membership in organizations like NU or Muhammadiyah) and political capital. Islamic parties have failed to "lock in" the votes of *ormas* members, who have become increasingly autonomous. While these individuals may follow religious edicts (*fatwas*) from their organizations, they exercise independent "rational choice" in the political sphere, often opting for nationalist parties that offer better patronage or policy alignment.

In summary, the "Structural Decay" of Islamic parties is a result of their inability to adapt to a landscape where nationalist parties have successfully occupied the religious center, while their own internal fragmentation prevents them from mounting a unified counter-hegemony.

Between Ideological Extinction and Metamorphosis

The fundamental question overshadowing the post-2024 electoral trajectory is whether Islamic parties in Indonesia are undergoing a terminal ideological decay leading toward "extinction," or an evolutionary metamorphosis. Seven decades of data suggest that Islamic parties are not perishing; rather, they are transforming into entities nearly indistinguishable from their secular-nationalist competitors in terms of organizational behavior and mobilization strategies.

The first, organizational metamorphosis: from *da'wah* movements to electoral machines. The most striking transformation is evident in the evolution of PKS and PKB. PKS, rooted in the *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Tarbiyah movement), was initially characterized

by ideological exclusivity. However, electoral data indicate that their growth stagnated when they relied solely on a pure cadre base, necessitating a shift toward a broader appeal.

Table 3. Typology of Ideological Transformation (1955 vs. 2024)

Dimension	Masyumi/NU Era (1955)	PKS/PKB/PAN Era (2024)	Status
Ultimate Goal	Sharia Implementation/Islamic State	Public Welfare/Good Governance	Metamorphosis
Mobilization Base	Religious Identity (<i>Aliran</i>)	Performance & Patronage (Clientelism)	Shift
Elite Structure	<i>Ulama</i> /Religious Scholars	Technocrats/Professional Politicians	Professionalization
Differentiation	Sharp Contrast with Nationalists	Blurred/Nearly Identical	Ideological Extinction

Source: KPU RI and BPS (2025), reprocessed

Interpreting this data through Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all party theory, Indonesian Islamic parties are metamorphosing into catch-all entities to avoid marginalization. However, the price is systematic de-ideologization. As noted by a central board member of a prominent Islamic party (Informant B, 2024):

"If we only discuss headscarves or Sharia bylaws, our vote share caps at 7%. We must address fertilizer, employment, and social assistance. We must be pragmatic because our voters are now highly transactional."

The second, ideological extinction and the post-Islamism thesis. The Indonesian phenomenon provides strong empirical verification of Asef Bayat's Post-Islamism thesis. Bayat argues that political Islam reaches a juncture where it recognizes the limitations of an Islamic state model and pivots toward civil rights and democracy. In Indonesia, this takes the form of "Ideological Extinction" at the policy level. Analysis of party manifestos from 1955 to 2024 reveals a systematic removal of terms like "Islamic State" or "Jakarta Charter," replaced by the narrative of *Islam Rahmatan lil Alamin* (Islam as a blessing for the universe). While this moderation is positive for democratic stability, it creates an "Identity Blur" that weakens brand distinctiveness.

The third is survival within a secular-pragmatic ecosystem. The post-2004 political ecosystem is dominated by two forces: *personalismo* (centralized figures) and clientelism. In this environment, parties that fail to metamorphose into patronage machines face electoral bankruptcy. *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB) serves as a tragic case study; by attempting to maintain the romanticism of Masyumi without robust patronage capital, their support has dwindled below the parliamentary threshold.

Table 4. Correlation Between Campaign Funding and Electoral Results (2024 Estimate)

Party	Ideological Intensity (Subjective)	Logistic Dependency	Electoral Outcome
PKB	Low	High	Increase/Stable
PKS	High/Medium	Medium	Stable
PAN	Low	High	Stable

PPP	Medium	High	Declining
PBB	High	Low	Marginal

Source: KPU RI and BPS (2025), reprocessed

This analysis verifies Ambardi's (2009) political cartel theory. "Successful" Islamic parties are those that integrate into the cartel, sharing state resources and adhering to the pragmatic rules of the game.

While metamorphosis allows parties like PKB and PKS to remain relevant, it carries the risk of long-term electoral decay. When Islamic parties no longer offer a moral alternative distinct from nationalists, voters lose their ideological tether. In an interview with a political analyst (Informant C, 2025), it was argued that this strategy is a short-term survival mechanism: "When every party becomes 'green-nationalist,' Islamic parties lose their brand uniqueness. They are trapped in a logistical war they are destined to lose against wealthier nationalist giants."

Ultimately, the 1955–2025 trajectory indicates that Indonesian Islamic parties are not facing physical extinction but a "substantive extinction." They have survived by becoming pragmatic, yet this creates a paradox: the parties remain in parliament, but the influence of distinct Islamic values in public policy is increasingly diluted by the interests of grand coalitions. Without a redefinition that addresses 21st-century economic challenges, the "Ummah Vote" will continue to deplete, marking the final sunset of the *aliran* politics that began in 1955.

CONCLUSION

This study has meticulously traced the electoral trajectory of Islamic political parties in Indonesia over a seven-decade span, from the dawn of democracy in 1955 to the complex contemporary landscape of 2024/2025. This longitudinal analysis reveals a striking sociopolitical paradox: while Indonesia has experienced a profound wave of Islamization within the public sphere, culture, and consumption patterns, the political parties explicitly championing Islamic identity have suffered from long-term structural decay. The primary findings confirm that the "Ummah Vote," which was formidably consolidated during the 1955 elections, has undergone permanent fragmentation, losing its hegemonic bargaining power within the Indonesian democratic framework.

Theoretically, this research provides a critical verification of the Inclusion-Moderation thesis. We argue that the inclusion of Islamic parties into Indonesia's liberal democratic system has not only moderated their behavior but also triggered extreme de-ideologization. The metamorphosis of parties such as PKB, PAN, and PKS into pragmatic and technocratic entities—while ensuring their institutional survival in parliament—has effectively eroded their brand differentiation. As nationalist giants like PDIP, Gerindra, and Golkar successfully adopted pro-Islamic symbols and policies, Islamic parties lost their theological monopoly, leading to a gradual but definitive decline in electoral support.

Furthermore, the study concludes that the inability of Islamic parties to maintain their vote share is not merely a failure of agency or campaign strategy. Rather, it is a

consequence of shifting sociological structures. The process of de-aliranization has transformed the *santri* (devout) electorate from ideological voters who adhere to clerical instructions into rational voters who prioritize macroeconomic issues and clean governance. In this increasingly transactional ecosystem, Islamic parties often lose the battle for patronage resources against nationalist rivals who possess superior financial capital and state access.

The implications for the future of Indonesian democracy are significant. If current trends persist, Islamic parties risk being relegated to "junior partners" within grand coalitions dominated by secular-nationalist forces. Without an ideological redefinition that addresses contemporary challenges—such as economic inequality, climate change, and social justice through a progressive Islamic lens—these parties face "substantial extinction." In this scenario, the party labels may survive, but their distinct struggle and identity will become indistinguishable from those of their competitors.

Strategically, Islamic parties must transcend symbolic politics. Future electoral success will no longer be determined by religious jargon but by the ability to translate Islamic ethical values into concrete, inclusive policy solutions. Moving from an "identity-based party" to a "values-based programmatic party" is the only viable path for metamorphosis toward 2029 and beyond. Ultimately, the history of these seven decades serves as a reminder that in the ballot box, personal piety does not inherently translate into political loyalty to a religious label.

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