European Defense Integration through the European Defense Industry Programme (EDIP)

A Governance and Regime Complexity Analysis of the German Defense Industry

Abstract

The escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict exposed structural vulnerabilities within European defense governance, particularly regarding market fragmentation and research duplication. In response, the European Commission proposed the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as a supranational governance instrument. However, a fundamental paradox emerges: the EU attempts to regulate defense procurement—a domain historically protected by Westphalian state sovereignty—creating severe institutional friction for member states, particularly Germany amidst its massive Zeitenwende policy. Previous scholarship predominantly conceptualizes European defense integration as either top-down legal compliance or purely economic market dynamics. Filling this literature gap, this article analyzes the asymmetries of sovereignty and institutional bargaining within the EDIP framework. Utilizing Qualitative Document Analysis (QDA) and Clive Archer’s international organization typology, this study demonstrates how Germany navigates a complex regime overlapping EU supranational ambitions, NATO interoperability standards (STANAG), and domestic protectionist imperatives. The findings reveal that EDIP functions primarily as a deliberative political arena where dominant donor states engage in strategic arbitration to balance domestic industrial sovereignty with regional integration goals. Consequently, EDIP’s implementation represents a transition toward managed supranationalism rather than linear legal coercion.